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Originally, only the European
Parliament had rules regulating lobbying[1]. For a period of time the Commission slowly moved towards the adoption of rules for regulating lobbying directed to its members. The first step,
was in 1992 the establishment of voluntary rules for lobbyists which did not apply
the disclosure of interests[2]. Then, there was a little stricter approach which introduced the need for the
registration for the causes persuaded by lobbyists[3]. Finally, the European Transparency Initiative requires lobbyist to register their interest prior to approaching the Commission.[4][5].
At present the registration is voluntarily, but positions of lobbyists failing to declare their interests will not be taken into consideration by the Commission. In future, the Commission might introduce the compulsory registration for lobbyists.
The subject
of this paper is to
assess the evolution of the rules for regulating lobbying directed towards the Commission and in particular to assess the newly adopted code of conduct
for lobbyists. This piece asses also the opinion of lobbyists on the issue.Ê Semi-structured interviews where conducted in Brussels in June 2005 and April 2007 with interest groups affected by the new approach
of the Commission towards the lobbying activity. In 2005, two Members of each the EP, Commission, and Council, three journalists and different special interest agents concerned with the REACH-directive (PLEON, Daimler-Chrysler, BASF, BEUC)
where interviewed concerning the proposed code of conduct for special interest groups[6]. The interviewees were asked to give
statements concerning the following propositions 1) a mandatory system of electronic
registration and reporting for all lobbyists with a “significant annual lobbying budget” (above par 6000
$ per semi-annum in the US lobbying disclosure act), 2) the restriction of employment of (former) officials of the Commission
and their relatives, a mandatory recordering of formal and informal meetings and logging of correspondence (fully searchable in an online database), and the opening
of all forums of dialogue where access is privileged (e.g. Cars21, Transatlantic Business Dialogue).
ÊIn March 2007 the Commission gave a summary to the Green Paper
consultations launched
in 2006, the central element
being the invitation to lobbyists to subscribe to a public register and to a common code of conduct[7]. In a follow-up
study in April 2007, three members of the Commission
and one member of the
EP where interviewed in
order to provide an insight into the development of the discussions
and the outcome of the initial proposal. We will show that the industrial lobbyists, although opposed to the opening
of the forums where generally perfectly willing to accept the far fiercer rules as advocated by ALTER-EU. That the representatives of the institutions
(Commission, EP, CON) already
during the first interviews in 2005 where backpedaling to give concise
positions on the TransparencyÊ initiative, underlining the importance of special interest groups for the decision making process in Brussels. The journalists interviewed in
2005 also seemed far more skeptical towards the initiative than the (corporate) lobbyists interviewed. This speaks for both the
anticipation of the lobbyists of the insufficient
outcome of the directive and secondly, for the degree
of reluctance of members of the institutions
to implement means that would produce transparency in
their relations to special interest groups and to restrict
access.
"An open and structured dialogue between the Commission and special interest groups", SEC(92)2272, 2 Dec. 1992.
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